The challenges are many and they vary according to the particular country. But some are general in nature and they would appear to be pertinent in one way or another to many countries, including our own, Mexico. Firstly, attention could be drawn to the challenge inherent in the (scant) confidence that citizens have in their government, in other words the low level of belief among society that governments are doing 'what is correct', what "is perceived as fair'. There is, of course, nothing new here: this issue emerged in more or less similar terms in The Crisis of Democracy, the report published by the Trilateral Commission back in 1975. However, it continues to be of such importance that it has served as a starting point for the more recent comparative report produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on the performance of governments of member countries (Government at a Glance 2013).

Independently of its strictly political aspects, the challenge represented by the (lack of) confidence among citizens is important in administrative terms, because it would appear to have serious repercussions on the degree to which those governed observe (or fail to observe) the existing laws (and therefore on how costly it is for the government to monitor their observance); on the degree to which those governed support action taken by public organisations in critical situations (e.g. floods, regional security problems); and it could even be an important factor when it comes to providing long-term support for 'structural reforms' that are proposed (for example, those that are currently being discussed in Mexico). So how might it be possible to increase citizens' confidence, firstly in their governments, and then, more specifically, in the public administration systems with which they interact on a daily basis in order to obtain public goods and services, and how can this be achieved in the short term?

A second challenge is that represented by 'permanent austerity'. Leaving to one side the major economic crises of the past (the recent past: the global crisis of 2008; and the slightly more distant past: the terrible years of 1980-1990 in Mexico), in the current scenario of low economic growth on an (inter)national scale and low levels of tax collection within the country, it becomes obviously simple to advocate low levels of government spending. However, efficiency for efficiency's sake, be this in its more economistic dimension of budget cuts and freezes, or in its somewhat broader neo-managerial dimension of efficacy, efficiency and economy, is problematic for at least two reasons.

Firstly, as Professors Christopher Hood and Christopher Pollitt have highlighted, because any 'cutback' strategy (and there is not just one, as people often think) has its own complexities and negative repercussions. And secondly, as Mark Blyth and David Stuckler/SanjayBasu have underlined, because austerity would appear to carry very high economic and, above all, social costs. Now, in a context of inevitable austerity, how can the budgetary resources of governments be distributed and administered effectively (achieving goals and objectives) and even efficiently (getting rid of superfluous or redundant expenses), but at the same time fairly and responsibly, without having an unjustified or disproportionate effect on daily operation or the future sustainability of public programmes?

A third challenge, whose implications have barely begun to be seriously considered in Mexico, lies in the emergence of new 'non-majoritarian' institutions. The basic characteristics of these public institutions, referred to as 'constitutionally autonomous' in Mexico, are that they have been created to develop highly specialised functions, under the leadership of persons (in theory) without any political affiliation and with extensive technical knowledge, who enjoy considerable (formal and informal) independence and who, as a result, are not obliged to subordinate institutional decisions to the political preferences or priorities of the moment. Thus 'autonomous' institutions respond to a highly distinctive strategy of institutional design, which is potentially useful, but which also leads to major politico-administrative tensions.

To a certain extent, independent central banks, autonomous regulatory agencies and other similar organisations (for a list of the Mexican experience, see aquí) respond to what Alasdair Roberts has called 'the logic of discipline': faced by the lack of confidence in the government, the solution is to depoliticise and, more specifically, to construct State institutions, but outside the government. On occasions, this is probably not only justifiable, but also necessary: the transition from the 'Positive State' (e.g. owner) to the 'Regulatory State', noted by Giandomenico Majone several decades ago, is perhaps best complemented by the presence and good performance of these types of institutions. However, in other areas of public policy, matters may be different. How, then, can it be ensured that these new state institutions will genuinely respond to a cross-party, apolitical and professional logic, and that at the same time they will be capable of reinforcing the transparency, reputation and legitimacy of regulatory processes in the economic field (e.g. competition, telecommunications), in the political domain (e.g. elections, evaluations) and in the social arena (e.g. access to information), in productive coordination with the other public and private institutions involved?

The fourth challenge to which attention should be drawn is related with the 'international dimension' of public administration. Although the boundaries of the nation-state continue to be an essential point of reference, and although when analysis is made there is a strong tendency in Mexico to highlight the distinctive 'national' features of any politico-administrative development, it is true to say that, at present, international factors are of enormous importance in the evolution of everyday public policies. Many of the most complex problems faced by governments today are transnational: climate change, arms trafficking, migration, drug trafficking and illnesses, for example. Consequently, what these situations require is co-ordinated international action. Global public goods, rather than purely national (local) solutions.

Furthermore, in many highly diverse public policy sectors, the dynamics of institutional change would appear to be more associated with international interdependence than with national negotiations. The processes of economic liberalisation, the creation of human rights institutions, the approval of regulations for tobacco control and norms for gender balance in public appointments, among many other developments, have highlighted the centrality of transnational patterns of policy diffusion and transfer. In other cases, international indices and rankings would appear to condition the agenda, if not to say the definition of problems and even the public policy solutions of national governments, for example, in sectors such as education and the fight against corruption. Now, given the necessary distinctive features of each country, how is it possible to consolidate a government that is attentive to its international environment, capable of providing global solutions and of learning from the policy experiences of other countries, without falling into the extreme of institutional homogenisation ('isomorphism'), which, as Matt Andrews has stressed, does not necessarily lead us to construct better governance conditions?

The politico-administrative challenges currently faced by the government of any country clearly go beyond those analysed here. However, perhaps the four areas identified here (together with the questions that have accompanied them) will serve as a pretext, as on the genuinely memorable observance days, for enlivening rich, polyphonic, entertaining and passionate discussion about the type of public administration our country will require in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century.